Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others; We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.
Introduction
Most applications of game theory suppose that the observed outcomes will correspond to equilibria, so it is important to consider which sorts of equilibrium concepts are applicable to various situations. The most compelling general explanation for equilibrium is that it arises as the long run outcome of some sort of non-equilibrium process of learning and adjustment. If the game in question is simply one round of simultaneous moves, and participants observe the outcome each time the game is played, then if play converges we expect the long-run outcomes to correspond to Nash equilibria. 1 However, when the game has a non-trivial extensive form, observed play need not reveal the actions that would be taken at information sets that have never been reached, so even if play converges incorrect beliefs may persist, and play may not converge to a Nash equilibrium. Self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) formalizes the idea that incorrect off-path beliefs can persist for settings where players observe the terminal node of the game each time it is played, and the only restrictions placed on the players' beliefs is that they be consistent with the equilibrium distribution on terminal nodes. However, because SCE places no a priori restrictions on the players' beliefs, it does not capture the idea that players use prior information about opponents' payoff functions to predict the opponents' play. To capture such predictions, Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (1999) (hereafter "DFL") define "rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium,"or "RSCE," which requires that players make certain inferences based on their knowledge of the other players' payoff functions and observation structure. For example, RSCE requires that player 1's conjecture about how player 2 thinks player 3 is playing be consistent with player 1's information about what player 2 observes.
Both SCE and RSCE apply to situations where all participants see the realized terminal node at the end of each play of the game. In some cases, though, players do not observe the exact terminal node that is reached. For example, in a sealed-bid uniformprice k-unit auction for a good of known value, the terminal node is the entire vector of submitted bids, but agents might only observe the winning price and the identity of the winning bidders. Alternatively, this information might only be made available to those who submitted nonzero bids, with the others only told that their bid was not high enough. Terminal node partitions are also natural when there are many agents in each player role: If we model each agent as a distinct player then a given agent in the role of player i need not observe the play of other agents in that role.
The rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) defined in this paper generalizes RSCE by supposing that each player has a partition over terminal nodes, and that players' beliefs are consistent with the observed distribution over the the partition but not necessarily consistent with the true distribution on terminal nodes. We should stress that both of these implicitly suppose that equilibrium play corresponds to an objective distribution; the main difference is that in RSCE all players observe the distribution over terminal nodes, while RPCE allows each player to have a different partition of the terminal nodes and supposes that each player sees the objective distribution over the cells of their own partition. In this case there is no longer a publicly observed outcome path, so the implications of common knowledge of the observation structure are less immediate. Roughly speaking, RPCE describes situations where players know that the outcome of play has converged, even when they do not observe all aspects of this outcome themselves. The RPCE concept is of interest in its own right; it also serves to provide additional support for the use of Nash and subgame perfect equilibrium in games where it coincides with one or the other. In particular, we will see that players can do a fair bit of reasoning about play they do not observe, even when we do not assume that players know one another's strategies.
We provide formal results to verify that RPCE behaves as expected and to relate it to past work, but much of our contribution comes from examples that illustrate various implications of RPCE. Many (but not all) of these examples use what we call "participation games;" we explore the impact of different terminal node partitions in these games, and also compare them to closely related games with sequential moves. The distinguishing feature of participation games is that some players have the option of an action called "Out": If a player plays Out, his payoff is 0 regardless of the play of the others, and he observes only his own action and payoff. Roughly speaking, the idea of RPCE is that if player 1 (say) always plays Out, but knows that players 2 and 3 play every period and observe the terminal node at the end of each round, and player 1 believes that play has converged, then she can use her knowledge of the payoff functions and observation structure to place restrictions on the (unobserved) play of her opponents; in particular, 1's belief about their play must be concentrated on the set of Nash equilibria of the "subgame" between them. In contrast, if player 1's choice of "Out" ends the game and prevents players 2 and 3 from acting, then when player 1 always plays Out players 2 and 3 do not have the chance to learn; here the only restriction on 1's belief when she plays Out is that the play of 2 and 3 is rationalizable.
In addition to the partition over terminal nodes, this paper differs from DFL by allowing players to have correlated beliefs about their opponents' play. As we argue in Example 8, terminal node partitions make the restriction to independent beliefs less compelling, even as a simplifying assumption: When a player knows that her opponents have repeatedly played a coordination game, but has not seen their actions, it seems odd to require that the player's beliefs about the opponents correspond to a product distribution. Put differently, with partitions on terminal nodes, play of the game on its own may provide some of the players access to a common signal that is not observed by others.
In general the set of RPCE outcomes depends on the terminal node partitions, because coarser partitions provide less information and so generate fewer restrictions on the allowed beliefs. The Appendix identifies four different reasons this dependence can arise, and then give conditions under which RPCE is invariant to changes of partitions.
Hahn's (1977) conjectural equilibrium is a forerunner of SCE in a specific setting, as it allows firms to misperceive demand at out-of-equilibrium prices. Battigalli (1987) defines what we call self-confirming equilibrium with independent, unitary beliefs, where "unitary" means that every action in the support of a player's mixed strategy is a best response to the same belief about play of the opponents, and "independent" means that each player's subjective uncertainty about the play of the others corresponds to a product distribution. give the first example where this sort of SCE has an outcome that cannot arise in Nash equilibrium. In the large-population learning models used to provide foundations for SCE, it is natural (though not necessary) to allow different agents to have different beliefs; the general definition, which allows correlated, heterogeneous beliefs, is due to Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) .
3 Allowing for heterogenous beliefs is more complicated, due to the need to capture the idea that each player knows the possible beliefs that others can have given the player's beliefs about equilibrium play. For that reason DFL restrict attention to unitary beliefs. This paper too restricts attention to unitary beliefs, to cut down on the number of new issues that need to be addressed at one time; note that unitary beliefs correspond to steady states of large-population learning systems when all agents in a given player role pool their information. Alternatively one can view our solution concept as providing predictions as a result of repeated interactions among a fixed set of players when the discount factor is small. In the companion paper (Fudenberg and Kamada, 2012) we allow for heterogeneous beliefs. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate the effect of terminal node partitions. Section 3 defines a model of extensive-form games with terminal node partitions. Section 4 revisits the example in Section 2, and analyzes other examples to show the implications of RPCE. Section 5 further motivates the RPCE definition by exploring the consequences of alternative specifications. Section 6 explains the connection between RPCE and other concepts from the literature, notably the rationalizable conjectural equilibrium (RCE) of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994) . This section provides an informal illustration of RPCE in the two extensive-form games in Figure 1 . We formalize the intuition after we provide a formal model; here we give only an informal argument.
In game A, player 1 moves first, choosing between In and Out. If he chooses In, players 2 and 3 play matching pennies with player i choosing between H i and T i . Player 1's payoffs are the amount that player 2 gets plus an "extra" of 0.1, if player 1 plays In.
When player 1 plays Out, all players obtain the payoff of 0. At the end of each play of the game, players observe the exact terminal node that is reached, as in self-confirming equilibrium.
In game B, player 1 moves first, again choosing between In and Out. Instead of 2 and 3 only acting when 1 plays In, now they play the matching pennies game regardless of 1's action. The map from action profiles to payoffs is exactly the same as in game A. The important assumption is that if 1 plays Out she observes only her own action and payoff but not the action of the other player: the corresponding cell of her terminal node partition contains four elements corresponding to the four possible choices of players 2 and 3. Players 2 and 3 observe the exact terminal nodes. Note that the observation structures for player 1 are the same in games A and B.
Note that even though player 1 receives the same information in these games, the observation structures of players 2 and 3 differ. In game A, players 2 and 3 do not observe each other's play when 1 plays Out, so there is no reason for player 1 to expect their play to resemble a Nash equilibrium. Consequently, an impatient player 1 might choose to play Out, fearing that player 2 would lose to player 3. In game B, on the other hand, players 2 and 3 observe each other's play, whatever player 1's action is. Thus they should be playing as in the Nash equilibrium of the matching pennies game, and 1 knows this, so she should play In.
In Section 4 we formalize this intuition. Before doing so, we provide a formal model of extensive-form games with terminal node partitions in the next section.
The Model

Extensive-Form Games with Terminal Node Partitions
X is the finite set of nodes, with Z ⊆ X being the set of terminal nodes. The set of players is I = {1, . . . , n}; H i is the collection of player i's information sets. Set H = ∪ i∈I H i and
In the main text we restrict attention to "one-move games," in which for any path of play each player moves at most once and there are no moves by Nature. 4 All the games in the examples in this paper are one-move games and there is no move by Nature. To model what players observe at the end of each round of play, let
be a partition over Z and P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ). We assume that the extensive form has perfect recall in the usual sense, and extend perfect recall to terminal node partitions by requiring that two terminal nodes must be in different cells of P i if they correspond to different actions by player i. If every terminal node is in a different cell of P i , the partition P i is said to be discrete. If the cell i observes depends only on i's actions, the partition is called trivial. Except where otherwise noted, we will require that u i (z) = u i (z ) if terminal nodes z and z are in the same partition cell, so that payoffs are measurable with respect to terminal node partitions.
Because we want to model equilibrium as an objective, steady-state distribution, while maintaing the simplicity of "unitary" beliefs (defined below) we need to allow for mixed strategies as outcomes of play. Here we adopt the simplest method, namely to let the players use mixed strategies, as in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1993) and DFL.
5 Player i's behavioral strategy π i is a map from H i to probability distributions over actions, satisfying
The set of all behavioral strategies for i is Π i , and the set of behavioral strategy profiles is Π = × i∈I Π i . Let
with typical elements π −i and π −i,j , respectively. A strategy profile π completely determines a probability distribution over terminal nodes; let d(π)(z) be the probability of reaching z ∈ Z given π, and let
Beliefs, Consistency, and Best Responses
As in DFL, we will require that players believe others will play optimally (according to their presumed payoff functions) even at off-path information sets, so we will need to specify assessments at off-path information sets: Player i's assessment at h ∈ H i is a probability distribution ∆(h) over nodes in that information set. For any h ∈ H i , i's assessment at h and her opponents' behavioral strategies π −i completely determine i's expected payoff for playing any strategy π i , conditional on h. Denote by
] the belief held by player i. That is, player i's belief consists of two terms. The first is a probability distribution over the opponents' strategies, and the second is a vector that specifies, at each information set h of player i, a probability distribution over assessments at that information set and opponents' strategies. We denote by b(µ i ) the probability distribution corresponding to the first term of the belief µ i , and by (µ i ) h the probability distribution corresponding to information set h in the second term. Note that the belief has sufficient information to calculate conditional expected payoffs at each information set.
We say that π −i is in the support of µ i if it is in the support of b(µ i ). We assume that the assessments are derived using Bayes rule whenever possible, while we do not impose any other restrictions. Formally, we assume that if information set h has positive probability given (π i , π −i ) for some π i ∈ Π i and π −i ∈ supp(b(µ i )), (µ i ) h is derived using Bayes rule.
Remark 1.
There are five main ways that this formulation differs from that in DFL.
(a) DFL require independent beliefs, which can be reduced to a single behavior strategy profile for the opponents using Kuhn's theorem as in Fudenberg and Kreps (1995) . We allow the possibility that player 1's belief about players 2 and 3's play corresponds to a correlated distribution. 6 Example 8 explains why this is desirable. DFL also require consistency of this single profile in the sense of Kreps and Wilson (1982) , while we allow arbitrary assessments here as long as they respect Bayes rule.
7
(b) We allow assessments to be correlated with the beliefs over opponents' strategies; Example 9 explains why.
(c) The formulation of beliefs allows for the possibility that a player believes that an opponent's strategy is correlated with the way a third player deviates; roughly speaking, this corresponds to departures from equilibrium play arising from "correlated trembles," as in the c-perfection of Fudenberg, Kreps, and Levine (1988).
(d) We allow i's belief to vary with i's information sets, because the posterior belief about which element in the support of the belief has been used may be different from the prior belief. This additional complexity is not necessary in DFL as they assume that the support of a belief consists of a single point.
We say that a belief µ i is an independent belief if b(µ i ) corresponds to a product measure, and the projection of (µ i ) h onto ∆(Π −i ) for each h corresponds to a product measure. In this case we associate µ i with (a i , π
corresponds to the product measure given by b(µ i ). 6 We model correlated beliefs as in Aumann (1987) and do not distinguish between correlation that corresponds to players believing that other players have access to a correlating device from what Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008) call "intrinsic correlation." Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) discuss the interpretation of correlated beliefs and its implications for self-confirming equilibrium. 7 Fudenberg and Kamada (2013) develop a restriction in the spirit of convex structural consistency (Kreps and Ramey 1987) . In the games considered in this paper, that restriction boils down to the condition that assessments are derived from Bayes rule whenever possible, which we have already imposed above.
We say that π i ∈ Π i is a best response to a belief µ i at h ∈ H i if the restriction of π i to the subtree starting at h is optimal against (µ i ) h in that subtree.
Versions, Conjectures, and Belief Models
To facilitate comparison with DFL, we model the beliefs of the players about the beliefs and play of others-their "interactive beliefs"-in the same way as DFL, using the idea of "versions" v i of each player i. As in DFL, only one of these versions corresponds to the way any player actually behaves; the other versions v i of player i correspond to a description of player i that some player j thinks is possible. 8 In DFL v i specifies player i's strategy, her assessment, and her belief about the opponents' play. The definition of a version in our context will be different from that of DFL, as we include the assessment as part of beliefs, and also associate with each version a probability distribution over opponents' versions that we call a "conjecture." We use these conjectures below to formalize an analog of the usual belief-closed condition-the idea that the play that player i expects to see is generated by the versions he expects are present. To introduce the notion of conjectures formally, we first need to specify a profile of sets of versions.
As in DFL, we will use the notion of belief model
where the first element is version v i 's strategy π i ∈ Π i , the second is her belief µ i , and the third is her conjecture p i ∈ ∆(× j =i V j ). Notice that the specification of conjectures allows correlated beliefs, as otherwise, p i must lie in the space × j =i ∆(V j ). We do not require that p i assigns probability 1 to a single version profile of the opponents: Even if player i is sure that there is only a single agent in player j's player role, she may not be sure whether this single agent is of version v j or v j .
We will impose a condition called "coherency" to connect the ideas of belief and conjecture; Remark 3 explains why we need both concepts.
We let K i < ∞ be the number of elements in V i . Finally, we will associate with each V i in a belief model an actual version v * i ∈ V i , which is the version that is objectively present. Any other versions of player i are called hypothetical versions, as they exist only in the minds of the other players.
Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium
When this condition is satisfied, the version's belief matches his own conjecture about the opponents' versions. The requirement that all versions in a belief model have a coherent belief is analogous to requiring the belief model be belief-closed, as defined in DFL. We make this analogy precise in the Appendix.
Recall that D i (π) is the distribution on i's terminal node partition induced by π.
In the defining equality, the left hand side is the distribution over i's terminal node partition generated by version v i 's strategy and v i 's belief about the opponents' play. The right hand side is the distribution that version v i observes if the actual distribution of the play is π * . That is, this equality says that v i 's observation (the left hand side) is equal to the actual play (the right hand side).
The next definition incorporates the idea that players know (i) the terminal node partitions of other players and (ii) that the opponents satisfy the self-confirming condition.
Definition 4. Given a belief model
V , v i = (π i , µ i , p i ) is observationally consistent if p i (ṽ −i ) > 0 implies, for each j = i,ṽ j is self-confirming with respect to π(v i ,ṽ −i ).
Remark 2.
(a) Ifṽ j is self-confirming with respect to π(
Hence the definition is equivalent to the following: "Given a belief model V ,
The left hand side in this equality is whatṽ j expects to observe given his belief under 
(d) The rationale for requiring observational consistency is that player i knows j's terminal node partition and knows that j's belief is consistent with what j observes, but in the model developed so far this knowledge is informal. In the Online Supplementary Appendix we make this interpretation precise, by constructing an epistemic model with the state space being the set of all possible version-partition configurations. 
Remark 3.
Even under coherency a conjecture over versions does not necessarily uniquely determine the belief over assessments and strategy profiles of the opponents, as the conjecture does not pin down off-path behavior. 10 Conversely, a belief over opponents' assessments and strategy profiles need not pin down a conjecture because the same belief about an opponent's play can be generated by different conjectures. One can give an equivalent definition of RPCE using a "more parsimonious" belief model in which versions describe only the player's strategy and conjecture, and defining the best response condition by requiring the existence of a belief coherent with the specified conjecture. However, to check whether the best response condition is satisfied one would need to construct the associated belief. Alternatively, versions could describe only the player's strategy and belief, but one would still need to construct the associated conjecture to verify that the version satisfies observational consistency.
In one-move games, the best response condition in the above definition is equivalent to "rationality at reachable nodes," which requires that a player's strategy maximize her expected payoff at every information set the strategy does not itself preclude. As discussed in DFL, imposing the best response condition at all information sets is not robust to small uncertainty about players' payoff functions. The definition of RPCE for general games replaces condition (2) with rationality at reachable modes-see the Online Supplementary Appendix for details.
Implications of RPCE
In this section we revisit Example 1 and consider several examples to illustrate the implications of RPCE. One of the themes will be the difference between situations where player 1 (say) prevents other players from acting (and thus from learning) and situations where the other players do act but player 1 does not observe their play. First we revisit Example 1 to show how the RPCE definition delivers the desired conclusion there. Example 2 adds a player to game B to study the assumption of higher order knowledge of rationality. In Example 3, RPCE implies that belief about unobservable play should correspond to actions that are not only rationalizable but also Nash. The Appendix generalizes this result to a class of "participation games." Example 4 provides an example that shows that some RPCE outcomes can only be sustained with belief models in which multiple versions of a given player play the same strategy. In that example, players 1 and 2 each has a single version, and their beliefs involve differing implicit models of the beliefs of player 4. To complement this example, Lemma 1 in the Appendix shows that in a RPCE, any version profile to which an actual version assigns positive probability is the actual version profile of some RPCE.
Terminal node partitions have various effects on the set of strategies that a player can play in a RPCE. Example 5 demonstrates that a player need not expect the unobservable play by the opponents to resemble a Nash equilibrium if their terminal node partitions are not discrete. Example 6 shows how giving a player a more refined terminal node partition can change his RPCE play even though that player's beliefs were correct in the RPCE for the coarser partition: The effect comes from the fact that with the finer partition other players know that the player's beliefs are correct. The Online Supplementary Appendix also provides examples to illustrate how the terminal node partitions change the set of strategies in RPCE, and identifies conditions under which the set is invariant with respect to the partitions.
Example 1 Revisited.
Here we show that in game A it is possible for player 1 to play Out in RPCE, but this is not possible in game B.
Consider game A, in which players 2 and 3 play matching pennies if and only if player 1 plays In. We argue that player 1 can play Out in a RPCE with the following belief model and actual versions 11 :
The actual version profile is (
Here, v 2 can believe that player 3 plays H 3 because she never gets to observe 3's play, while v 3 plays H 3 because he believes that 2 plays T 2 , which again is justified by the fact that he is not observing 2's play. Since v 1 never observes 2 and 3's play, and she knows that they do not get to play on the path so do not observe each other's play, she can believe that they can have such mutually inconsistent beliefs, hence can entertain a belief that the opponents play (H 2 , T 3 ), which is consistent with the self-confirming condition. Now we turn to game B, where players 2 and 3 play matching pennies regardless of player 1's action but 1 only observes their play when she chooses In. Fix a RPCE π * ,
with an associated belief model V . Suppose that some version of player 1's belief assigns a positive probability to a version profile (ṽ 2 ,ṽ 3 ) such thatπ 2 andπ 3 are not best responses to each other. Suppose without loss of generality thatπ 2 is not a best response toπ 3 .
Notice that by the observational consistency condition, we have
for all π −2 in the support ofμ 2 . Since player 2 observes the exact terminal node reached, this implies thatμ 2 assigns probability 1 toπ 3 . But this means that the best response condition is violated for player 2. Therefore, it must be the case that, for any v 1 , µ 1 assigns probability
* is generated by the actual versions, we conclude that π * 1 assigns probability 1 to In, that is, player 1 plays In with probability 1.
Example 2.
Consider a modification of game B , where we add "player 0" at the top of the extensive-form game. Specifically, player 0 moves first, choosing between In and Out. Whatever action is played, the game goes on and game B is played, where only player 1 knows the action taken by player 0. The map from the action profile for players 1, 2, and 3 to their payoffs are exactly the same as in game B, while player 0 gets 0 if he plays Out, 1 if he plays In and player 1 also plays In, and −1 if he plays In and player 1 plays Out. The terminal node partitions are the same as in game B, where everyone knows the move by player 0, and player 0 observes everything if he plays In and does not observe anything if he plays Out.
In any RPCE of this game, player 0 must play In, because player 0 must infer that player 1 plays In. Remember that in Example 1 all versions of player 1 must play In; the coherent belief condition ensures that player 0 believes that 1 plays In with probability 1.
12
This example shows that RPCE assumes that a player not only believes that the play by the opponents has converged, but she also believes that an opponent believes that the play by these opponents has converged. 12 Player 0 can play Out if players 2 and 3 observe whether 0 played In or Out before they move. In that game, if 0 usually plays Out, then when 0 unexpectedly plays In 1 has no reason to think that 2 and 3 have converged to equilibrium play, so 1 can play Out in the belief that 2 would lose, so 0 can play Out.
Example 3.
Figure 3
Consider the game in Figure 3 . Everyone observes the exact terminal node reached, except that player 1 cannot distinguish between the opponents' action profiles if she plays Out.
Notice that H 2 is a best response to H 3 , which is a best response to T 2 , which is a best response to T 3 , which in turn is a best response to H 2 . The game has a unique Nash equilibrium, namely (N 2 , N 3 ) . Hence all actions are rationalizable, while only N i is in the support of Nash equilibrium strategy.
In this game, RPCE requires not only that 1 expects 2 and 3 to play rationalizable actions, but also that she expects their play to correspond to a Nash equilibrium. Hence 1 should expect the payoff of 1 from playing In, so 1 should play In. The proof of this is exactly the same as in Example 1: if player 1's belief assigns a positive probability to a version profile such that player 2 is not best responding to player 3, observational consistency condition for player 1 implies that the best response condition for player 2 should be violated.
It is important here that 2 and 3 do not observe 1's action before they move, as otherwise 1 can play Out, believing that 2 and 3 play H i or T i after In 1 . This example shows that in RPCE, beliefs about unobserved actions on the path of play should correspond to actions that are not only rationalizable but also Nash. We generalize this in Theorem 3 in the Appendix.
Example 4 (Need for Duplicate Versions).
Figure 4
The game depicted in Figure 4 is a modification of the "horse" example in . Instead of having player 3 move only when 1 or 2 plays down, we now suppose that 3 moves whenever 4 plays a dominant action at the root node, and 1 and 2 do not know 3's play as long as both play "across." The terminal node partitions are such that everyone observes the terminal node reached, except that if (A 1 , A 2 ) is taken then 1 and 2's partitions do not reveal 3's choice.
This game has a RPCE in which (A 1 , A 2 ) is chosen. Specifically, consider the following belief model:
The actual version profile is (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 ).
Notice that V 4 has two versions, both of which play the same strategy. This is a necessary feature of any belief model that supports the outcome involving (A 1 , A 2 ). This is because this (A 1 , A 2 ) can happen only when 1 and 2 disagree about 3's play, and know that 4 observes 3's play. This means 1 and 2 must also disagree about what 4 believes, which requires there be (at least) two versions of player 4, and both versions need to play R 4 as it is a dominant action.
13
This need for two versions that play the same strategy is a new feature that arises with nondiscrete terminal node partitions; such duplicate versions do not enlarge the set of RSCE, because in RSCE players can only disagree about play off of the equilibrium path. Consider the game in Figure 5 . Player 1 does not observe the exact terminal node if she plays Out 1 , and she observes the exact terminal node reached if she plays In 1 . The 13 A formal proof goes as follows: Suppose that there is only one versionv 4 in V 4 , and thatv 4 believes that L 3 is played with probability p ∈ [0, 1]. By coherency, all versions of players 1 and 2 must have a conjecture that assigns probability 1 tov 4 . Then observational consistency implies that all versions of players 1 and 2 must believe that L 3 is played with probability p ∈ [0, 1]. But since p > 1 3 implies that D 1 is strictly better than A 1 and p < 2 3 implies that D 2 is strictly better than A 2 , (A 1 , A 2 ) cannot be played.
14 Fix a belief model used to justify a RSCE π * in the DFL model, and suppose that it has m versions (v other players' terminal node partitions always reveal 1's move but only reveal the exact terminal node if they play In i . Notice that for any Nash equilibrium of 2 and 3's simultaneous move game, player 1 expects a payoff of at least 1 2 from playing In 1 . Thus if 1 believes that 2 and 3's play corresponds to a Nash profile, she must play In 1 . We argue, however, that in RPCE it is possible for player 1 to play Out 1 . Specifically, consider the following belief model and actual versions:
The We note that Out 1 could not be played in any RPCE if the terminal node partitions for players 2 and 3 were discrete. This is because player 1's payoff is 1 2 in every Nash equilibrium of the game between players 2 and 3, so by Theorem 3 in the Appendix she should play In. Hence, nondiscrete terminal node partitions allow an action to be played even if the action is outside the support of equilibria under finer partitions. In other words, the conclusion of Theorem 3 may fail if the hypothesis that player 1's opponents have discrete partitions is weakened.
To sum up, this example shows that a player need not expect unobserved play by the opponents to resemble a Nash equilibrium if these opponents do not observe the exact terminal nodes, and as a consequence she may play an action that she would not play otherwise.
Example 6 (Learning from an Opponent's Play).
Figure 6
Here we provide an example in which difference in partitions affect learning. If one player's partition is finer than another player's then the latter can learn by observing the play of the former and can respond accordingly, while if the partitions are the same then there is nothing to learn.
In the game in Figure 6 , all players observe the exact terminal node reached, except that player 1's and 2's partitions do not reveal 3's action if 1 plays R 1 .
First, we show that player 1 can play R 1 in a RPCE. To see this, consider the following belief model and actual versions:
The actual version profile is (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 ).
Notice that players 1 and 2 disagree about player 3's action, which neither of them observe when 1 plays R 1 , which is why 2 can play L 2 even though 1 is playing R 1 . Now we show that if player 1's partition is discrete, she can no longer play R 1 . In such a situation, because player 1 has a discrete terminal node partition and player 2 does not, player 2 can learn 3's play by observing 1's play. For this reason, player 1 cannot play R 1 in a RPCE, while 1 could play R 1 if players are not required to believe that other players act rationally. 15 To see that R 1 cannot be played, suppose the contrary. The best response condition for player 1 and observational consistency applied to player 2 imply that player 2 believes that 3 is playing R 3 with probability at least 1 2 , and then the best response for player 2 is to play R 2 with probability 1. However, this implies that 1's payoff from playing L 1 is 0.1 > 0, so she cannot play R 1 . On the other hand, if player 1 does not know 2's payoff function, the fact that 2's behavior reflects her belief about 3's play doesn't convey any information to player 1. So 1 can believe (L 2 , R 3 ) is played with probability 1, making R 1 possible. The key is the observational consistency condition: player 2 knows player 1 observes 3's play, so 2's belief about 3's play must match with what 2 thinks 1 is best-responding against.
Notice that player 1's belief in the RPCE we constructed for the original terminal node partitions is in fact correct. However, when 1's terminal node partition is discrete, 1 can no longer play R 1 : With a discrete terminal node partition for player 1, player 1 knows player 2 can and should learn 3's play by observing 1's play. But this is impossible when 1 and 2's terminal node partitions coincide.
Justification of the RPCE Definition
In this section we consider several examples to justify the details of the definitions of RPCE. In each of these examples, we consider a game and a RPCE outcome that we think is plausible as a consequence of rational learning, and study whether the outcome would still be a RPCE under alternative definitions that might seem natural to some readers.
Specifically, Example 7 explains why the self-confirming condition should not be imposed on hypothetical versions, Example 8 argues that we should allow for correlated beliefs in our model, Example 9 justifies our specification of the space of beliefs.
Example 7 (Self-Confirming Condition for Hypothetical Versions). 15 The Online Supplementary Appendix develops the concept of "partition-confirmed equilibrium" or PCE, which extends SCE to games with non-discrete terminal node partitions. Roughly speaking PCE corresponds to weakening condition (2) of RPCE and also dropping the coherency condition (4).
Figure 7
Consider the game in Figure 7 . The terminal node partitions are such that everyone observes the exact terminal node reached, except that 1 does not observe 2 and 3's play if she plays Out.
Intuitively, if 1 thinks that 2 and 3 coordinate on the (R 2 , R 3 ) equilibrium, she has an incentive to play Out, which makes her unable to observe how 2 and 3 play. Given what 1 is observing, 1's belief that 2 and 3 coordinate on the (R 2 , R 3 ) equilibrium does not contradict the assumption of the common knowledge of rationality and the observation structure.
Indeed, the outcome (Out, L 2 , L 3 ) is possible in RPCE. To see this, consider the belief model and actual versions:
Notice v 2 and v 3 are hypothetical versions, and they do not satisfy the self-confirming condition. v 1 plays Out because she conjectures that these hypothetical versions exist, and her conjecture is never falsified because she plays Out. Now we show that the outcome (Out, L 2 , L 3 ) is impossible if we require the selfconfirming condition for hypothetical versions. To see this, suppose that we strengthen Definition 5 by replacing condition (3) with the condition that for all i and v i , v i is selfconfirming with respect to π * . Under this stronger condition, the best response condition implies that all versions of player 2 should play L 2 and that all versions of player 3 should play L 3 , so player 1 must believe that players 2 and 3 play (L 2 , L 3 ). But then by the best response condition player 1 must play In.
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Example 8 (Correlated Beliefs).
Figure 8
Our formulation of beliefs is more complicated than DFL, because we allow for correlated beliefs, while DFL restricted attention to independent beliefs. In this example player 1 can play an action only when she has correlated beliefs about the play at information sets that she does not observe.
Consider the game depicted in Figure 8 . This game is similar to Example 7, but player 1 has two actions that make the terminal nodes observable for her; her decision amounts to either betting on the action that players 2 and 3 will coordinate on, or declining to bet. The terminal node partitions are such that everyone observes the exact terminal node reached except that player 1 cannot distinguish among four terminal nodes that are caused by the action Out.
To capture the long-run consequences of rational learning, RPCE should allow for the possibility that 1 plays Out. Intuitively, since players 2 and 3 get to play on the path, they should play as in a Nash equilibrium of their coordination game. Hence it makes sense for player 1 to believe that players 2 and 3 coordinate on either (L 2 , L 3 ) or (R 2 , R 3 ), but that they are equally likely. 17 Given this belief, the expected payoff from playing action A is the average of 1 and −2, which is − 1 2 , and the payoff for action B is also − 1 2 in the same way. Hence, with this belief, playing Out is optimal, as it leads to the payoff of 0. Player 1 can play Out in RPCE as shown by the system 18 :
Just as with SCE, one can refine the set of RPCE by requiring independent beliefs. In some cases this might be viewed as an innocuous simplifying assumption, but we think the restriction would be problematic here, because the fact that players 2 and 3 observe each other's play means that the extensive form and terminal node partitions provide them with a particular sort of correlating device.
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Moreover, if player 1 is restricted to hold an independent belief, the action Out is impossible. To see this, notice that for Out to be at least as good as playing A for a version of player 1, her belief has to assign probability at least 1 3 to (R 2 , R 3 ). In the same way, for Out to be at least as good as playing B for a version of player 1, her belief has to assign probability at least 1 3 to (L 2 , L 3 ). However, any independent randomization by players 2 and 3 leads to the situation where the minimum of the probabilities assigned to (L 2 , L 3 ) and (R 2 , R 3 ) is no more than 1 4 . Hence for any independent beliefs, Out cannot be a best response.
We note that, as in Example 5, if the terminal node partitions were discrete, player 1 could not play Out. However, the reason behind this effect of terminal node partitions is different: Here it is that player 1 can entertain a correlated belief, which she would be unable to have if she actually observes 2 and 3's play.
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Example 9 (Assessment-Strategies Correlation).
Figure 9
We have allowed v i 's belief at h, (µ i ) h , to lie in the space ∆(∆(h) × Π −i ) and not necessarily in ∆(h)×∆(Π −i ). Here we provide an example that justifies this specification.
Consider the extensive-form game depicted in Figure 9 . All players observe the exact terminal node reached, except that players 1 and 4 do not distinguish among those terminal nodes that are caused by R 4 .
We first show that R 4 is compatible with RPCE. For example, consider the following belief model and actual versions.
20 A similar argument can be made in Example 9 below to show that player 1 cannot play Out and so player 4 cannot play R 4 .
To support R 4 , it must be possible that 4 believes 1 plays Out once her information set is reached. For this play to satisfy the best response condition at this information set, we should allow for player 1 to believe that players 2 and 3's play is correlated, just as in Example 8. Notice that player 1 knows that 2 and 3 are actually playing the coordination game on the path of play because 4 plays R 4 , thus this correlated belief seems plausible, and it is possible in RPCE when each profile of opponents' strategies is associated with a different assessment. However, it is impossible if only a single assessment is used for a distribution of the opponents' strategies. Indeed, for any single assessment at 1's information set, 1's expected payoff from playing either A or B is at least 1 4 , so playing Out can never be a best response. Hence player 4 should expect the payoff of 1 by playing L 4 , which means that 4 cannot play R 4 .
Because the belief model underlying the play of R 4 seems sensible, we would not want to refine the set of RPCE by insisting that each version has a point distribution on assessments. The definition of RPCE allows each version to have a non-point distribution on assessments, and in particular it enables player 4 to play R 4 in this example.
RPCE, RSCE, and RCE
In this section we compare RPCE with other concepts from the literature. In Subsection 6.1 we compare RPCE with RSCE, and show that RPCE "reduces" to RSCE if the terminal node partitions are discrete and beliefs are independent. In Subsection 6.2 we compare RPCE with RCE (Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1994) , and show that when the signal function specified in the definition of RCE corresponds to partitions of the terminal nodes, RPCE is equivalent to RCE if moves are simultaneous.
Rationalizable Self-Confirming Equilibrium
In this subsection we show that RPCE reduces to RSCE if we require independent beliefs when the terminal node partitions are discrete. Given these restrictions, there remain two apparent differences between RSCE and RPCE: First, in RSCE the self-confirming condition is required for all versions, while in RPCE it is required only for actual versions. Second, observational consistency is not directly imposed in RSCE but it is imposed in RPCE. We show that these two differences do not affect the set of equilibria when independent beliefs are required and the terminal node partitions are discrete.
To see this formally, let us first define RSCE (notations are adjusted to accord with ours). This concept is defined for games with discrete terminal node partitions.
Definition 6. π
* is a rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium if there exist a belief model V and an actual version profile v * such that the following five conditions hold: 21 1. π * is generated by v * .
For all i and v
i = (π i , µ i , p i ), π i is a best response to µ i at all h ∈ H i . 22 3'. For all i and v i = (π i , µ i , p i ), d(π i , π −i ) = d(π * ) for all π −i in the support of µ i .
For all
As noted earlier, there are two main differences between this definition and that of RPCE, namely that condition (3') (every version expects the same distribution over terminal nodes) is stronger than condition (3), and that observational consistency (5) is not directly imposed in RSCE. Even with a discrete terminal node partition the way condition (3) is stated is somewhat different than condition (3'), 23 but as the next result shows this difference is irrelevant. 
Condition (3') implies condition (5).
The proof of this result is in the Appendix. Part 2 is not surprising: Since the terminal node partitions are discrete, condition (3') essentially requires that the terminal node reached is common knowledge, so observational consistency holds. Part 1 says that in the presence of the observational consistency condition, requiring the self-confirming condition for hypothetical versions does not further restrict the set of equilibria. Notice that this conclusion was not true when we considered RPCE with nondiscrete terminal node partitions (See Example 7). 21 DFL allows allπ that have the same distribution over terminal nodes as π * to be RSCE, but this difference is not important for our purpose.
22 DFL required optimality only at the information sets that have positive probability under π i , but the difference is immaterial in one-move games. 
Corollary 1. RPCE with independent beliefs in games with discrete terminal node partitions is equivalent to RSCE.
In the next example, which is taken from DFL's Example 3.2, we show that the set of possible outcomes can expand if we relax the definition of RSCE equilibrium by replacing condition (3') with condition (3).
Example 10 (DFL).
Figure 10
Consider the game depicted in Figure 10 , where all players' terminal node partitions are discrete. DFL argue that the outcome (u, U ) is impossible in RSCE, because if 3 chooses U then 2 should play a since he observes the terminal node, and then 1 should take r. However, if we replace condition (3') by condition (3) in Definition 6 where observational consistency is not imposed, this outcome becomes possible. To see this, consider the following belief model and actual versions:
The actual version profile is (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 ) .
Here all the conditions in the definition of RSCE other than condition (3') hold, as does condition (3) . Notice that v 1 , v 2 , and v 3 are not self-confirming with respect to the actual distribution π (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 ) , and they are hypothetical versions and not actual ones.
The key is that the actual version of player 1, v 1 , conjectures that 2 believes that 3 plays D, and this conjecture is ruled out by observational consistency: The equation in Remark 2(a) of observational consistency applied to v 1 's belief is d (b, (u, D)) = d(b, (u, U ) ). But this equation is false.
Notice that the set of SCE is the same with (3) or (3'), thus requiring optimality at off-path information sets is the key to this example.
Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium
The main difference between RPCE and RCE is that RPCE, like RSCE, requires players believe others will play rationally (maximize the presumed payoff functions) as long as they have not behaved irrationally in the past, while RCE is designed to model normal form games and places no restrictions on play at off-path information sets. 24, 25 Because of this difference, RPCE makes stronger predictions than RCE in most extensive-form games. If all information sets are on every path, this distinction becomes moot, and the two concepts become equivalent. In particular, in one-shot simultaneous-move games, we can state the precise connection between RCE and RPCE. To do so we first define RCE, using the notation of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994) as much as possible. Consider a normal-form game with players I = {1, . . . , n}, the action set A i , A = × i∈I A i , and A −i = × j =i A j , the payoff function u i : A → R. The set of mixed strategies
There is a set of private signals S i , and a signal function g i : A → S i . g i (a) is the signal that i privately observes when the action profile is a ∈ A. With an abuse of notation we write g i (m) for a probability distribution over S i given the mixed profile m ∈ M , called a random signal. Let σ i ∈ ∆(S i ) be the general element of the set of random signals.
The strategy-signal pair (m i , σ i ) is said to be g-rationalized An RCE is m * ∈ M such that there exists g-rationalizable sets B 1 , . . . , B n such that
For an extensive-form game Γ with terminal node partitions P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ), let (A Γ , g P ) be the pair of normal-form representation of Γ and the profile of signal functions
) that corresponds to the map from action profiles to the terminal nodes according to partition P. Conversely, given any (A, g) with g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) such that g i (m) = g i (m ) implies m i = m i (so that the (extended notion of) perfect recall assumption is satisfied), we define the related simultaneous-move extensive form game Γ A , and endow it with the terminal node partition P g that corresponds to g.
Finally, we say that a behavioral strategy π is equivalent to a mixed strategy profile m or a mixed strategy profile m is equivalent to a behavioral strategy π if π is generated by m according to the Kuhn's theorem. Now we are ready to state the formal connection between the two concepts. We omit the proof.
Theorem 2.
1. Any RPCE in (Γ, P) is equivalent to some RCE in (A Γ , g P ).
Any RCE in (A, g) is equivalent to some RPCE in (Γ
One consequence of this equivalence is that RCE, like RPCE, requires that in games like Example 3 when player 1 plays Out 1 she believes the play of the others has corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. 26 In particular this is true even in a three-player game where players 2 and 3 play the game of Shapley (1964) , where fictitious play and smooth ficititious play do not converge. 27 Because play in the Shapley cycle corresponds to a correlated equilibrium, this example may suggest an alternative equilibrium concept in which players 26 The Appendix gives a formal definition of the class of "player-1 participation games" and proves this claim.
27 Brown (1951) introduced fictitious play as a way to compute Nash equilibria. Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) give fictitious play a descriptive interpretation in strategic form games, and point out some problems with that interpretation when the process cycles as instead of converging to constant play of a fixed pure action profile.
expect that unobserved on-path play corresponds to a correlated equilibrium. We do not define this alternative here because consideration of a few other examples convinced us it was typically too inclusive.
Conclusion
Like RCE and RSCE, RPCE combines the idea that players have partial but objective information about equilibrium play with the idea that players reason about the observations and incentives of others. RSCE applies to extensive-form games where players see the realized terminal node at the end of each play of the game; RPCE generalizes this to situations where players see only a partition of the terminal nodes. In addition, RPCE relaxes the independent-beliefs condition of RSCE to allow for correlation.
The examples show that (1) under RPCE a player's belief about the actions of others can depend on whether those others get to act along the equilibrium path, (2) unobserved on-path play provides a natural form of correlating device, (3) a player can learn about the unobserved actions of a second player from the actions of a third, and finally, (4) the precise implications of all of the above depend on the nature of the terminal node partitions. In general, coarsening a player's terminal node partition cannot restrict the set of that player's RPCE strategies, but it can enlarge it. We identified four reasons that this enlargement can occur, and provided a sufficient condition under which coarsening a player's terminal partition has no effect on his RPCE strategies. We also showed how RPCE reduces to RCE and RSCE in the appropriate special cases.
The Online Supplementary Appendix discusses further topics. Among others, it provides a definition of RPCE in general games in which each player can move multiple times on a single path of play, develops an epistemic model to justify the definition of observational consistency, and discuss in detail the effect of changes in terminal node partitions on the outcomes under RPCE. 
B A Theorem for Participation Games
The class of participation games generalizes some of the examples from the text. Intuitively, this is a game in which player 1 has an option to play Out at the root node that prevents her from observing the consequence of the opponents' actions at the terminal nodes, and other players play a game, not knowing player 1's action. Formally, a player-1 participation game Γ (with a payoff function u and the set of players I) is an extensive-form game with the following properties: Fix player 1's set of actions A 1 such that one of its element is Out, and another extensive-form game Γ with a payoff function v and the set of players I \ {1}. Denote by n(x, a) the node in Γ that corresponds to x in Γ after action a ∈ A 1 is taken.
• At the root node player 1 moves, choosing between In and Out. 28 Note that the "replacement" of
remarked on after the definition of observational consistency only works for actual versions.
• Whichever action is taken, Γ is played after player 1's decision.
• Nodes n(x, a) and n(x , a ) for x, x ∈ X \ Z are in the same information set in Γ if and only if x and x are in the same information set in Γ .
• Terminal nodes n(z, a) and n(z , a ) for z, z ∈ Z are in the same cell of the terminal node partition of player i if and only if z and z are in the same cell for i and a = a , except for the following exception.
• Terminal nodes n(z, Out) and n(z , Out) for z, z ∈ Z are in the same cell of the terminal node partition of player 1.
• u i (n(z, In)) = v i (z) for all i, u i (n(z, Out)) = v i (z) for all i = 1, and u 1 (n(z, Out)) = 0. . By the definition of RPCE player 1's action does not affect any opponent's payoff nor observation. Thus it is trivially true that π −1 (ṽ −1 ) is a RPCE of Γ , with the belief model being V such that we delete all the reference to player 1. Since the action of the actual version of player 1 is a best response to her belief in the original RPCE and we have just shown that any point in the support of this belief constitutes an actual version profile of RPCE of Γ , the proof is complete. 
C Proofs
In this section we provide the proofs of the results stated in the main text. 29 
Proof.
Fix a strategy profile that is generated by a belief model V and an actual version profile v * in which all versions have coherent independent beliefs and satisfy the best response condition. Construct a belief modelV in which everything is the same as in V except that each belief (µ i ) h in V is replaced with belief (μ i ) h that has a unit mass on a single point corresponding to the weighted average of the original belief (µ i ) h . Specify the same actual versions as in the original model. Since two beliefs (µ i ) h and (μ i ) h induce the same probability distribution over terminal nodes given any of i's strategies by construction, the best response condition is still satisfied in the new belief model. Also, since the point to which (μ i ) h assigns the unit mass can be generated by a "mixture" 30 over strategies in the support of (µ i ) h by the assumption of independent beliefs, the belief-closed condition is also satisfied. The converse direction is analogous: for any strategy profile which is generated by a belief-closed belief model in which the best response condition is satisfied for all versions, we can replace each belief by a probability distribution over the support of the "mixture" in the belief-closed condition, which guarantees coherent and independent beliefs, and the best response property is preserved.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Part 1: Fix an actual version v * and a belief model V that satisfies conditions (3) and (5) . Construct a new belief modelV that is identical to the original one, except that all versions that do not satisfy the equality in (3') in V are eliminated and each version's conjecture assigns the same weight to the versions that are still inV . Specify the same actual version profile as in V (such versions are not eliminated because of condition (3)). By construction, condition (3') holds. Hence by part 2 that we prove below, condition (5) holds as well. Finally, we check that the sum of probabilities assigned by the conjecture of any remaining version is unity, and the coherence belief condition 
